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Critical Perspectives on Megan's Law:
Protection vs. Privacy
Prof. Nadine Strossen
NADINE STROSSEN: I want to call this gatheringto order. My name
is Nadine Strossen. I am a member of the faculty at New York Law
School and also the National President of the American Civil Liberties
Union.
I am delightedto be here to introduce our distinguishedspeakers
at this important conference. I really want to sincerely thank them for
taking the time from their busy schedules to share their expertise with
US.
I also want to thank New York Law School and the New York
Law School Journal of Human Rights for organizing this significant
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
program. I want to extend a special thanks to two individuals with
whom I have had the pleasure of working very closely in connection
with this conference for their outstanding efforts. First and foremost,
Roger Gold, the Executive Topics Editor of the Journal of Human
Rights. Roger did the lion's share of the work in putting this program
together, and it was a big lion. Second, I would like to thank my
academic assistant, Raafat S. Toss, who also provided valuable
assistance.
This symposium could not be more timely. We have recently
marked the first anniversary of the original Megan's Law' in New
Jersey.
Ever since Megan's Law was originally proposed, it has
provoked widespread discussion and controversy.' On the one hand, it
has been very popular among the public and politicians.' Other
jurisdictions-including our federal government-have passed or are
considering laws that are modeled on it.' On the other hand, though, it
I N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996). The statute took effect on
October 31, 1994. Id.
2 Arguments in favor of and in opposition to sex offender notification laws can be
found in articles and news publications. See, e.g., Patricia L. Petrucelli, Megan's Law:
Branding the Sex Offender or Benefittingthe Community?, 5 SEToN HALL CONST. L.J. 1127
(1995). "Megan's Law may not be a panacea to all the ills from which society suffers due
to crimes committed by sex offenders," but "it is certainly a step in the right direction." Id.
at 1169. Jason Gottlieb, Megan Ill-Served by Assembly, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Sept.
6, 1994, at B9; Guy Sterling, Sex Offender Nearing His Release Will be First to Test
Megan's Law, STAR LEDGER (Newark), Dec. 31, 1994, at 1; G. Scott Rafshoon, Community
Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44 EMORY
L.J. 1633, 1667, 1673 (1995). The author states that sex offenders may be driven out of
communities by notification laws, but the laws do nothing to stop sexual abuse. Id.
' See Nekesa M. Moody, Liberals Feel Pressure to Pass Megan's Law, ASSOC.
PRESS, June 25, 1995 (statingthat Congress recognizes the immediacy of the registrationand
notification laws); Ivette Mendez, Megan's Tragedy Touched Public's Heart, Brought
Change to Protect Kids, STAR LEDGER (Newark, New Jersey), Jan. 1, 1995 (stating that
public fervor and exposure forced politicians to pass registration and notification laws).
4 See Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The
Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and UnintendedResults Associated with the Scarlet Letter
Law of the 1990's, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 788 (noting that while Congressman Jim Ramstad of
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is the subject of ongoing legal challenges,' and serious arguments have
been made that Megan's Law violates a range of constitutional rights.'
Moreover, there is a raging debate about whether the law is wise or
effective from a public policy and public safety point of view.7
In light of the law's recent anniversary and the ongoing litigation
surrounding it, all of these important questions are now getting more
attention than ever.' To cite just one example, they were the subject of
Minnesotawas starting work on a bill to require sex offenders to register with police, New
Jersey and Washington passed laws in the "memory of the victimized children," referring to
Megan Kanka of New Jersey and Zachary Snider of Washington).
See Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996);
E.B. v. Poritz, 914 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. N.J. 1996). This case challenged the registration and
notification laws and the Court temporarilyenjoined notification. Id.; see also Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d 367 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995).
6 See, e.g., Artway, 81 F.3d at 1245 (challenging enforcement of Megan's Law,
contendingthat enforcementof the law would violate various "federal constitutional rights,
includingequal protection,due process, and the right not to be punished in violation of the
Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses"); see also Doe v. Poritz, 662
A.2d at 380 (noting "plaintiffsclaims are the same as any offendercould assert... although
his expostfacto and bill of attainderclaims apply only to previously convicted offenders");
Elga A. Goodman, Megan's Law: The New Jersey Supreme Court Navigates Uncharted
Waters, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 764 (1996) (noting the constitutional challenges raised
against Megan's Law).
'See Earl-Hubbard,supra note 4, at 850-53 (identifying some of these concerns,
including that "a sex offender registry may have limited usefulness due to the scope of the
individuals forced to register, the lack of resources available to monitor compliance, and the
minor penalties attached for failing to register"); see also Rafshoon, supra note 2, at 1674
(stating that sex offenders can move away from states without notification and render
registration laws virtually useless, and that notification could have the effect of deterring sex
offenders from registering and could "encourage future crimes particularly if the fear of
being found out prevents offenders from seeking legal help once they are released").
8See, e.g., Andy Newman, Megan, Her Law and What It Spawned, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1996, § 13 at 1; Bruce Fein, When a Sex OffenderMoves In, Is there a Duty to Warn
the Community? Yes: Community Self-Defense Laws are Constitutionally Sound, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1995, at 38 (supporting Megan's Law because although the law is "no panacea," any
impact on crime is "welcome"); Edward Martone, When a Sex Offender Moves In, Is there
a Duty to Warn the Community? No: Mere Illusion of Safety Creates Climate of Vigilante
Justice, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 3 (opposing Megan's Law because it will lead to vigilante
justice).
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a recent major article in the New Jersey edition of the New York Times
What we fairly loosely call "Megan's Law" actually consists of
several different provisions," each of which raises distinct constitutional
and policy issues." For that reason, the Journal of Human Rights has
assembled this distinguished panel of speakers, who will discuss various
facets of the inter-related issues that are at stake from diverse
perspectives.
Speaking of perspectives, I have to disclose what I'm sure many
of you already know, namely, that the A.C.L.U. has been a leading
opponent of these laws all across the country. 2 And I personally have
'Newman, supra note 8, at 1.
0 These includeN.J. STAT. ANN. §2C: 7-1(West 1995 & Supp. 1996) Registration
and Notification of Release of Certain Offenders Act; Legislative Findings and Declarations;
§2C:7-2 Registration of Sex Offenders; Definitions; §2C: 7-3 Notice of Obligations to
Register as Sex Offender; §2C:7-4 Registration Forms; Contents; Transmission of Forms;
§2C:7-5 Records; Access; Immunity; §2C:7-6 Notification of Community of Intent of Sex
Offender Released From Correctional Facility or Adjudicated Delinquent to Reside in
Municipality; §2C: 7-7 Chief Law Enforcement Officer To Provide Notification to
Community; §2C:7-8 Notification Guidelines; Identification of Factors to Risk of Re-
Offense; §2C: 7-9 Immunity From Civil and Criminal Liability for Providing or Failing to
Provide Relevant Information; § 2C 7-10 Notification Concerning Other Dangerous
Circumstances Unaffected; §2C: 7-11 Notification of Advisory Council Established;
Qualifications of Members.
Another aspect of Megan's Law is that it provides for prolonged detention after the
offender's sentence has expired. Id. at §30:4-27.10; see also generally Rosie Sherman,
PsychiatricGulag or Wise Safekeeping? Lawmakers Use Civil Commitment to Detain Sex
Offenders, NAT. L.J., Sept. 5, 1994, at Al (stating that Megan's Law "requires an end-of-
sentence review for every convicted sex offender and allows the attorney general to apply
for the civil commitment of those who have demonstrated a pattern of compulsive behavior
and pose a danger to others").
" See Goodman, supra note 6, at 779 (discussing how the registration and
notification laws have been constitutionallychallenged based on claims that they violate Ex
Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, Double Jeopardy, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Due Process,
and Equal Protection Clauses, and they also violate the right to privacy).
2 See Simeon Schopf, Megan's Law: Community Notification and. the
Constitution, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 119 (1995) (stating "[tihe ACLU and
others argue that it is unconstitutional to treat sex offenders differently from other violent
criminals").
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often argued against them, most recently on a CBS television show a
couple of weeks ago.
But my role here is not to present arguments against the law.
That will be done ably by other speakers. I am here only in a neutral
capacity to give you some brief biographical information about our
moderator for this opening';session and the participants in it. They all
have very impressive credentials. For that reason, I want to leave as
much time as possible for them to speak. Accordingly, I am only going
to be presenting brief biographical headlines about each of them in the
order in which they will speak.
First, our moderatorwill be my esteemedNew York Law School
colleague, Stephen Newman. A graduate of Columbia Law School, who
has been on our faculty since 1974, Professor Newman has published
many scholarly and popular writings in the family law area. He also
appears frequently on news and public affairs broadcasts to discuss
family law issues.
Our first speaker is Jane Grail, Assistant Attorney General for
Legislative Affairs in New Jersey. Ms. Grail's responsibilities include
formulating legislative initiatives and developing and advocating the
Attorney General's position on pending legislation. She has also taught
criminal justice at Temple University and Trenton State College.
Our second speaker will be Robert Farley. Since January 1995
he has been Deputy Attorney General for Governmental Relations and
Chief of the Legislative Division in the New York State Attorney
General's Office. Prior to that, Mr. Farley served as counsel to the
Assembly minority leader and was also elected to the Schenectady
County Legislature.
Our next speaker will be Linda Fairstein. Ms. Fairstein is Chief
of the Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit and Deputy Chief of the Trial
Division in the Manhattan District Attorney's office. In 1993, Ms.
Fairstein published a book entitled Sexual Violence: Our War Against
Rape, for which she received Glamour Magazine's Woman of the Year
award. She has also received numerous other awards and has widely
lectured on most aspects of the criminal justice system, including sexual
1997]
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assault. As I warned her in advance, I cannot resist adding what I
consider the single most intriguing item on Ms. Fairstein's impressive
resume. She has just written a crime novel, which will be published by
Scribner this summer, and I'm really looking forward to reading it.
We will next hear from Professor John Gibbons. Since 1990,
Professor Gibbons has been the Richard J. Hughes Professor of
Constitutional Law at Seton Hall University School of Law. Before
joining the Seton Hall faculty, Professor Gibbons served on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for twenty years and for the last
three of those years was the Chief Judge. Professor Gibbons, by the
way, prefers to be called "Professor," not "Judge," showing an admirable
sense of priorities. Professor Gibbons represented the plaintiff in the
Artway) 3 case, the federal court challenge to the retroactive application
of Megan's Law. Professor Gibbons also filed a brief in the New Jersey
Supreme Court case Doe v. Poritz,"4 concerning the constitutionality of
Megan's Law on behalf of the A.C.L.U. of New Jersey. He has also
been an active volunteer lawyer with the A.C.L.U. of New Jersey in
other cases as well. That is likewise true of our next speaker, Professor
Ronald Chen.
Professor Chen teaches at Rutgers Law School in Newark and
is also the acting Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Rutgers Law
School. Professor Chen has litigated many important constitutional
cases. Of particular note for present purposes, in December 1994 the
U.S. District Court in New Jersey appointed him Special Pro Bono
Counsel in Diaz v. Whitman,5 a challenge to certain aspects of Megan's
Law.
Following ProfessorChen is one of his colleagues from Rutgers
Law School, Alex Brooks, who is the Justice Joseph Weintraub
Professor of Law Emeritus at Rutgers. Professor Brooks is an
intemationallyknown lecturer and scholar in mental health law. In 1975
"3 Artway v. Attorney General of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666 (D. N.J. 1995).
14 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
"5 No. 94, slip op. at 9 (D. N.J. Jan. 3, 1995).
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